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The Ineliminable Distortion of Reality 
On Causality, Representation, Abstraction and Idealization in Batterman’s 
Philosophy of Science 
 
Abstract 
Robert Batterman claims that asymptotic explanations in physics are acausal, involve un-de-
idealizable idealizations and are counter-examples to the mapping account of the role of 
mathematics in physics. In this paper, I analyze and criticize aspects of this claim, especially its 
implications for metaphysics and to a lesser extent methodology in physics. Regarding causality, 
Batterman has advocated that explaining emergent physical phenomena such as the universality of 
critical exponents in phase transitions involve throwing away causal details, and that we should 
replace Kim's requirement of emergents having novel causal powers with emergents figuring in 
novel explanatory stories, see (Batterman, 2002).  I argue that Batterman’s view of causality is 
ontologically too restrictive. I also argue that it is methodologically too restrictive, in that 
abstractions in science, including some involved in examples given by Batterman, e.g. (Batterman, 
2002) (Batterman, 2009) almost always involve throwing away details (causal or otherwise), but 
that this does not imply throwing away the category itself (e.g. causality), see also (Batterman & 
Rice, 2014), (Lange, 2015). I further argue that even if physical explanations do not directly appeal 
to causal factors at the macro level, they presuppose them. For instance, the modeler’s choice of 
which parameters (or dimensions) are essential to the explanation of a certain phenomenon and 
which are consequently taken as a starting point for a dimensional analysis, see (Batterman, 2002), 
(Barenblatt, 1979), presupposes a causal structure of the universe in terms of dependent and 
independent variables. Sometimes such presuppositions can be explicated as ontological 
assumptions built into systems of units of measurement.  If no causality is presupposed, the account 
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will be subject to the same type of criticism as the deductive-nomological model, e.g. why not 
explain the length of strings of pendulums via an analysis of parameters connected to their periods 
and gravitational acceleration? I conclude that although asymptotic explanations do not directly 
appeal to causality, they do not exclude causality at the macro-level and there are many prima facie 
reasons to keep causality at this level. I defend this against claims made about the existence of non-
causal explanations in physics, e.g. by claiming that physical explanations require a global theory, 
see (Wayne, 2015) or that they proceed by appealing to fictional highly idealized models in physics, 
see (Bokulich, 2011), (Pexton, 2014), (Wayne, 2015).  I claim that these arguments do not preclude 
that causality is presupposed at the macro-level, except perhaps in quantum theoretical explanations 
in which case an appeal to Bohr’s correspondence principle may be required, a mystery which will 
not be solved here.  
Going into more details with asymptotic explanations, I argue that Batterman’s argument that these 
are mathematical operations and not mathematical structures, see (Batterman, 2010), is not 
convincing, as the distinction between a mathematical operation and a structure is very hard to 
uphold. I also argue that his argument that they are counterexamples to the mapping account of 
mathematical explanations in physics is imprecise in one aspect, as an idealized misrepresentation 
of a phenomenon is still a representation of that phenomenon. I find at the core of Batterman’s view 
on asymptotic explanations an ineliminable distortion of reality, the appeal to the singularity. One 
central problem in that discussion is whether we should consider reality itself as distorted in the 
singularity, and our representation of it to be correct in some sense, or we should say that our 
representation of reality is distorted and important aspects of reality are unknown to us? I comment 
on this question.  
I conclude that the existence of asymptotic explanations should not influence our views of causality 
at the macro-level and that they are not convincing counter-examples to the mapping account of 
3 
 
mathematical explanation in physics. They do, however, point to a very central problem in the 
interpretation of physical terms, i.e. what actually happens in the singular limit?  
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